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RECENT DECISIONS
threaten to strike, or enter into contract, for a "dosed shop", even to
the extent of monopolizing the whole industry or community.'8 It
will be noticed that the purpose and the methods still have to be law-
ful, although the courts have become very liberal in this respect.'9
The anti-injunction acts have made it almost impossible to obtain an
injunction in labor disputes; 20 however, the unions are still liable in
damages for violence and other unlawful'acts. 2' The right of an em-
ployer to hire and fire has not as yet been taken from him, though
qualified almost to the point of extinction.22 The language of some
cases is dangerously broad,2 3 but labor has not been permitted to abuse
its power of monopoly too much.24
R. B. F. G.
LABOR-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD-EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. - Defendant was charged with unfair
labor practices. Defendant lumber company's logging and milling
operations are carried on entirely within the State of Washington,
nine-tenths of its output, however, being shipped in interstate com-
merce. In 1933 a company union was formed. In 1934 a group
of defendant's employees formed a union affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor. In an election under the National Industrial
Recovery Act' the latter union was selected as the sole bargaining
representative of the employees. A strike was called in May, 1935.
Prior to the National Labor Relations Act becoming effective,2 defen-
dant discharged all employees on strike. Company then reemployed
those employees who renounced all affiliations with any labor organi-
"See note 15, supra.
' See note 8, supra.
NORRIS-LAGuADIA AcT, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115
(1932) ; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., - U. S. -, 58 Sup.
Ct. 703 (1938); see (1938) 13 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 171; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr
§ 876-a (and annotated cases); see (1938) 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 358.
1 See Ed. N. Y. L. J., May 28, 1938.
' Sherman v. Abeles, 265 N. Y. 383, 193 N. E. 241 (1934); O'Keefe v.
Local 463, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938).
. See American Fur Mfrs. v. American Fur Coat, 161 Misc. 246, 252,
291 N. Y. Supp. 610, 617 (1936).
"' Brescia Const. Co. v. Stone Masons Ass'n, 195 App. Div. 647, 187 N. Y.
Supp. 77 (1st Dept. 1921); Falciglia v. Gallagher, 164 Misc. 838, 299 N. Y.
Supp. 890 (1937). In these cases, the union was acting as a tool in the hands
of a monopolistic employers' association.
148 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 702 (1934).
249 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1935). The constitutional-
ity of the Act was upheld in N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
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zations. A company union was formed which the defendant domi-
nated and financially supported. The Board charged that these acts
were unfair labor practices 3 and ordered (1) the rehiring of striking
employees with back pay, (2) the company to bargain collectively
with the union, and (3) the withdrawal of all recognition from the
company union. On appeal of defendant from the order of the Board,
held, affirmed. National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber
Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
The company contends that the Act is not applicable inasmuch
as (1) it was not engaged in interstate commerce, (2) that at date of
effectiveness of Act the relation of employer and employee had been
terminated. That the commodity might eventually be shipped in inter-
state commerce is not sufficient, reason to consider the entire business
as such. 4 The court relying upon the later decisions of the Supreme
Court ' held that if the practices are likely to "obstruct, restrain, or
burden" the shipment of commodities in interstate commerce, Con-
gress may subject them to federal supervision and control. That there
is a distinct tendency towards this latter construction is apparent. 6
Inasmuch as the doctrine of the Carter Coal Co. case, upholding de-
fendant's contention, is inconsistent with the more recent decisions of
the Supreme Court,7 it must be disregarded. Here the obstruction
of the defendant's operations by unfair labor practices prevented his
product from entering interstate commerce and as such, was within
'49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp. 1935) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer:
1. To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
2. To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it * * *
3. By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discharge membership in any
labor organization * * *
5. To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of the
employees * * *"
" Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475 (1886); Heisler v. Thomas
Colliering Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 883 (1922); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1935).
'United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570
(1922); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup.
Ct. 551 (1925) (where the Court found sufficient evidence to show such
obstruction); N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937) ; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup.
Ct. 855 (1935).
'See N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 31, 32,
57 Sup. Ct. 615, 621, 622 (1937). The court said, "It is a familiar principle
that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce or
its free flow are within the reach of Congressional power * * *. It is the
effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion."7 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615
(1937); Edwards v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937);
N. L. R. B. v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 9th,
1937), aff'd, 58 Sup. Ct. 656, 302 U. S. 680 (1938). -
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the scope of the Act." The discharge of the strikers does not termi-
nate the relationship of employer and employee, for under the Act a
striking employee does not lose the identification of employee.9 This
relationship between the company and the striking employees has not
been so completely terminated as to have no further connection with
the company's business or the commerce in which it is engaged. 10
The mere fact that the labor dispute"' had commenced prior to the
passage of the Act does not withdraw the parties or the dispute from
the regulatory power of Congress as to the acts subsequently occur-
ring.12 This is not unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law
because of refusal to employers of the right to hire and discharge em-
ployees at will. 13 It is clear that the restriction on the employer's
rights, which is contained in the Statute, although curtailing his un-
restricted use of the right to hire and fire, is directed merely at its
abuse for the purpose of interfering with union activities.' 4
J. J. S.
LABOR - NoRRis-LAGuARDIA ACT - FEDERAL JURISDICTION -
APPLICATION OF THE Ac.-The defendant corporation operating
stores in the District of Columbia employs both white and colored
persons. The petitioner, a corporation composed of colored persons,
in an effort to force the defendant to adopt a policy of employing negro
clerks in certain of its stores caused a member of the alliance to picket
one of the defendant's stores. There existed no employer-employee
'49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (7) (Supp. 1935): "The term 'affecting
commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce, or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
0 49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3) (Supp. 1935): "The term
'employee' * * * shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment."
" Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., 302 U. S. 731, 58 Sup. Ct.
55 (1937).
"49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp. 1935): "The term 'labor
dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in nego-
tiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
"The court was of the opinion that the act defined its retroactive intention,
but in rendering its decision confined itself to acts committed by the defendant
subsequent to the effectiveness of the act. Instant case at 145.
"N. L. R. B. v. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., 85 F. (2d)
990 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), cert. granted, 299 U. S. 533, 57 Sup. Ct. 112 (1936),
aff'd, 301 U. S. 142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648 (1937).
"Legis. (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1098, 1123.
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